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Since the founding of the Caliphate in June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has 
gained worldwide media attention for its campaign of violence across Iraq and Syria.  
Social media, particularly Twitter, has become a main aspect of ISIS’s media campaign.  
It has been used to spread propagandistic images and videos of ISIS into the 
Twittersphere.  This propaganda is important to ISIS because it spreads their message far 
past its occupied borders and helps to gain support from a wider audience.  Using social 
media analysis and Twitter’s own APIs, this research focused on ISIS’s Twitter 
propaganda campaign and sought to discover the underlying network structure.  The 
resulting network structure – scale-free – is then analyzed to see how it affects ISIS’s 
dissemination of propaganda on Twitter.  Ultimately, this research hopes to start a 
conversation on how network structure can be used to stop terrorist organizations from 
spreading their message online. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social media has quickly become an information platform that is used by millions 
around the world (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010).  The posts, tweets, images, and videos 
posted to these sites show a bit of the world from many varied perspectives (Shirky, 
2011).  But, as these different information systems have risen to the forefront, they are 
also being used not to just show the daily happenings in a normal life but also to inform 
and gain support for various campaigns.  These campaigns may run from the political, 
such as the 2014 US Congressional campaigns (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2014) to pop 
culture, such as who will win on The Voice or American Idol (Signorini, 2014).  These 
larger campaigns, however, are not all as innocuous as who is the “best” singer in the 
competition.  Indeed, some of these campaigns focus on propagandizing for a cause that 
has been designated as a terrorist threat from multiple nations and multi-national 
organizations.  The most sophisticated of these “global jihadi” social media campaigns 
comes from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (al-Tamimi, 2014, p.8).  ISIS has a 
developed and masterful social media campaign designed to attract the greatest amount of 
attention from the greatest amount of people in the hopes of turning some of these people 
towards their cause and jihadi ideology. 
 While ISIS is not the only terrorist organization using social media, they have 
shown themselves to – so far – be the best at manipulating social media’s resources to 
serve their cause and the best coordinated presence on social media (Glint, 2014).  The 
social media platform they are currently the best at manipulating and using is Twitter
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(Providence Research, 2014).  Through tweeting, ISIS disseminates their “brand image” 
to the world and creates networks where ISIS militants and supporters can come together.  
These connected networks allow militants, supporters, sympathizers, and administrators 
to spread information to a large, public audience.  
Research and Motivation 
The motivation for this research paper centers around understanding the networks 
ISIS forms on Twitter.  These Twitter networks are the points of information distribution 
for ISIS’s Twitter campaign; from these points comes most of the data.  By moving from 
the overall Twitter base, to recognizing these center points, an overall greater knowledge 
about these network structures can be found.  The rationale behind this study is that by 
completing it and gaining the knowledge it provides, a solution can begin to form on how 
to combat ISIS on Twitter.  This thesis seeks to understand the flow of information and 
the social network relationships by looking at how ISIS English-language users are 
propagandizing through the social platform of Twitter. 
Understanding the overall network structure ISIS uses on Twitter is important 
because this network is being used to gain supporters for a malicious cause, and while 
authorities believe that suspending accounts is helping to slow ISIS propaganda on 
Twitter, they have not figured out a way to more effectively slow down these networks 
(Berger, 2015).  While ISIS accounts on Twitter may be growing more slowly than in the 
past (Berger, 2015), they are still using other social media sites such as Diaspora (Stone, 
2014), and understanding their social network structure for one major social media outlet 
could give a better understanding to how they will grow their propaganda campaign on a 
new social media outlet.  As ISIS continues to post videos, photos, and messages about 
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executions, hostages, magazines, and other forms of propaganda, it is important to 
understand the overall network of this dissemination in order to best know how to 
dismantle such a terrorist network. 
While ISIS uses Twitter for all the reasons mentioned above, one of its big 
purposes – and the main focus of this study – is propaganda.  Propaganda is a popular 
topic of study, especially in communication studies, and has many definitions.  For this 
research, propaganda will be used in accordance with the following definition: 
Propaganda is a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the 
desired intent of the propagandist. (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006, p. 269).  
 
According to this definition, many things that ISIS tweets can be considered propaganda 
because it is an overall campaign meant to manipulate perceptions and cognitions.  This 
research will focus more on propaganda as a reaction to critical incidents rather than 
more mundane details about life mainly because reactional data is easier to track and 
gather. 
 This reactional data will help to show the configuration of the ISIS’s overall 
Twitter network.  Journalists, analysts, and government-sponsored agencies have written 
about ISIS’s sophisticated Twitter campaigns (Providence Research, 2015).  Much of this 
sophistication, and the outreach it allows, arises from both gaming the social media 
system and, perhaps more importantly, from the overall structure of the network.  The 
network balances between centralized and decentralized in order to spread its propaganda 
campaign as far as possible.  This fragmentedness (Walker, 2015) results in there being 
the centralized, professional media campaign that is disseminated by the higher-up 
authorities in ISIS, and then the decentralized, “independent actors” (Kingsley, 2014), 
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who seem to spread this information to a larger population of social media users.  It is 
this balanced network that has helped to form the “sophisticated online propaganda 
machine” (Zayadin, 2015) currently influencing the ISIS battlefields and the world’s 
home front.  The configuration of the network structure is important in understanding 
how and why this balancing act between centralized and decentralized has been so 
effective.  
Research Questions 
This research paper will seek to find answers to the questions of:   
1. How does the configuration of ISIS’s Twitter network affect the dissemination of its 
propaganda? 
1.1  Does ISIS’s dissemination of propaganda information on Twitter result in more than 
one central actor responsible for the dissemination of information on Twitter? 
1.2  What is the role of the central actor responsible for dissemination of information?   
1.3  How do other actors carry forward the propaganda articulated by the central actor? 
These questions seek to unearth how ISIS’s disseminates their propaganda on 
Twitter, and what network structure this dissemination takes.  Understanding the network 
structure is important for discovering how users get their information, and from a 
government standpoint, how this spread of information could be attacked and shut down.  
ISIS may be the first terrorist group to use Twitter as effectively as they have, but more 
terrorist groups will learn from them, and will take these tactics as their own.  Learning 
now how terrorists disseminate propaganda information can provide help in the future for 
fighting against cyber propaganda from extremist groups
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RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Brief History of Social Media 
Within the last ten-to-fifteen years, the use of social media on the Internet has 
exploded.  As of July 2014, Facebook reported 1.32 billion monthly active users with 
users spending an average of 40 minutes each day browsing the social networking site 
(Brustein, 2014).  YouTube reports statistics of 1 billion unique users each month with 
80% of its traffic coming from outside the United States.  These users then reportedly 
watch a collective 6 billion hours of video each month (YouTube, 2014).  Twitter, one of 
the newer social media technologies, already attracts 284 million monthly active users 
who tweet more than 500 million tweets a day (Twitter, 2014).  Of these user accounts, 
77% of them are outside the United States.  These are remarkable statistics for 
technologies that have only been around for ten-to-fifteen years at the most.  And while 
social media is used for all types of activities, from the mundane—tweeting about what 
you are wearing or where you are going—to the remarkable—finding a biological family 
member or thanking a stranger for an act of kindness—the uses of social media and its 
impact on society are still being explored. 
Terrorism, propaganda, and use of social media 
One of the more controversial usages of social media is its use by terrorists, 
terrorist organizations, and individuals claiming to wage ‘jihad.’  Terrorist groups have 
long used the Internet as a platform for disseminating information, planning, recruiting, 
and financing (Weimann, 2014).  Gabriel Weimann, a noted expert on terrorism and the
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Internet, provides brief history of how far terrorist organizations have come since 1998, 
when only about 15 designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations had a web presence 
(2004).  By 2000, most organizations had a presence on the web and official ways to 
communicate with followers and supporters.  Most of this online communication was 
done in the early years by top-down websites and then later, on interactive forums (Zelin, 
2013).  The top-down websites held a “complete monopoly” (Zelin, p. 4, 2013) over the 
content of the website.  The jihadi organizations would post official material, press 
releases, and videos here, and this material would then be filtered down through the 
users.  It was not interactive, nor did it allow common, individual, users to upload their 
own materials.  Instead, all materials were approved and displayed based on the site 
administrators who were normally hand-chosen by the jihadi organization to approve 
such content or directed to add materials immediately for distribution.  
As the Internet gained traction, and more and more terrorist organizations moved 
their materials to the web, interactive forums and emailing groups began to pop up.  
These forums and groups existed (and still exist) not just on the Dark Net but also in 
more common places like Google and Yahoo communities (Denning, 2009).  These 
forums and emailing groups provide a way for jihadists, want-to-be-jihadists, and jihadist 
supporters to interact with each other without identifying who they are.  A posting on a 
jihadist forum actually explains the process of setting up a fake Google or Yahoo account 
in order to start one of these groups (Weimann, 2011).  These forums and groups are 
intriguing because they show the evolution from top-down mandated content to a more 
interactive organization.  The users of the forums and the groups themselves can post 
content and discuss information (Zelin, 2013).  While this information can then be 
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deleted and the user possibly banned, it does allow for more dialogue amongst the 
general users.  However, these forums and groups are still authenticated and only allow 
people who are already members of the forum or who have been invited to the group to 
participate in the discussion. 
This authentication of data and users rapidly changes with the introduction of 
social media platforms.  With the introduction of Youtube in 2005 (Youtube, 2014), 
Facebook in 2006 (Facebook, 2014), and Twitter in 2006 (Twitter, 2014), the ability to 
network and disseminate information online became easier than ever.i  The leader of Al-
Qaeda after Osama bin-Laden’s death, Ayman al-Zawahiri, acknowledged the powerful 
use of media by stating that “[m]ore than half [of what the United States considers 
terrorism] is taking place on the battlefield of the media, [for] we are in a media battle for 
the hearts and minds [of Muslims]” (al-Zawahiri, 2006 as cited by Archetti, 2012).  Not 
only did this expansion into the media and social media realms allow for easier access to 
jihadists in various parts of the world but it also made it easier to connect with non-
jihadists who could be swayed to support the movement (Seib & Janbek, 2010).  Along 
with this ease of access, it also gave the individuals of these organizations more power 
because they could post their own ‘original’ content instead of just re-issuing what the 
administrators of a site posted.  For ISIS, this means that their fighters on the ground have 
just as much sway over the hearts and minds of possible supporters on Twitter as top 
officials do (Hall, 2015).  Their posts about daily life or about ideology are just as strong 
of propaganda as any authenticated information (Hall, 2015).  No longer is the 
communication network solely comprised of top-down websites or authenticated forums; 
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instead, anyone can decide what they want to post about such as:  their beliefs, 
organizational news, events, and media. (Zelin, 2013). 
Brief History of ISIS and Use of Social Media 
This move to social media, especially to real time posting platforms, has been 
highly reported on by news outlets such as CNN, BBC, and The Atlantic, and academics 
such as Gabriel Weimann.  No group to date seems to have made the move, and made it 
quite as successfully as the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) (Nissen, 2014).  The 
history of ISIS can perhaps explain how they have been so successful in using social 
media platforms.  The roots of ISIS began in 2004 as a splinter al-Qaeda group in Iraq 
(Stern & Burger, 2015).  This group, which was at the time known as al Qaeda in Iraq, 
began to amass power as it disseminated its Islamic ideology and also began crafting a 
strategic plan to power.  In 2006, al Qaeda in Iraq’s leader, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, 
announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) (Weiss & Hassan, 2015).  By 
2010, the leader of this new group, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was killed during a U.S.-Iraqi 
operation, and the current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, came into power.  In the years 
that followed, al-Baghdadi oversaw the expansion of ISI into Syria as ISI took advantage 
of the Syrian Civil War to declare a merger with an al Qaeda backed group in Syria 
known as the al-Nusra Front (CNN, 2014).  The merger of these two groups resulted in 
what we now know as ISIS (or, as al-Baghdadi proclaimed, Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL)).  This merger, however, was not agreed upon by the al-Nusra Front, and al 
Qaeda soon broke ties with ISIS.  In 2014, ISIS, led by al-Baghdadi, proclaimed the 
creation of a Caliphate and changed their name to the Islamic State.  This history spans 
the years that social media itself was coming to the forefront of web technologies.  As 
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Ryan (2014) expresses in her article on how ISIS and al Qaeda use Twitter and other 
social media differently, ISIS attempts to propagandize “young, disillusioned Westerners 
who are ripe for radicalization,” and who are seeking a sense of community (p.2).  
Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube are prime tools for this because they reach a much 
younger audience.  Ryan also notes that al Qaeda still focuses mostly on the older style 
websites and forums.  These were the “hot” new technologies when al Qaeda first came 
around to using them, but much of the media attention has moved away from the older 
styles to the new social media platforms.  ISIS uses this new attention on social media 
platforms to generate attention for themselves. 
 This attention to campaigning on social media has been called “sophisticated” by 
multiple reputable sources in the media such as the BBC (2014), the Atlantic (2014), and 
Time (2014), and by academic scholars and researchers such as Weiss and Hassan 
(2015), Stakelbeck (2015), Providence Research (2015), and Hall (2015).  This social 
media campaign focuses on demonstrating a single goal (the Caliphate) and a common 
purpose towards attaining this goal (Nissen, 2014).  Nissen (2014), of the Royal Danish 
Defense College, also notes that ISIS has formed a narrative around this single goal and 
places a “shared” history on it in order to entice more followers into the fold.  This 
narrative is that a singular Caliphate marks the return to the original Islam and as such, 
the Islamic State offers a “utopian Muslim universalism” that does not make distinctions 
about a person except their “degree of zealotry” (Hussein, as cited by Nissen, 2014, p.2).  
By forming this singular goal with a singular narrative, ISIS can place themselves as the 
underdog in a world that is against them; they can become the heroes simply fighting for 
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their homeland rather than disillusioned men savaging and destroying countries and 
people. 
ISIS, Propaganda, and Twitter 
While ISIS makes plenty of use of other social media platforms to project this 
“underdog” campaign, much of the campaigning centers on Twitter.  Within this social 
media platform, ISIS has a distributed hierarchy to disseminate information and drum up 
support.  This hierarchy starts with the official top-down administration as seen in older 
terrorist websites, but then goes down to supporters or sympathizers who may not even 
be officially part of, or even fighting for, ISIS (Nissen, 2014).  The central administrators 
provide more polished video content, important news or ideological facts, and then this 
gets re-tweeted over and over as it makes its way out into the “Twittersphere.”  The more 
outside supporters and the militants provide information about how “peaceful” life in the 
Islamic State is, how they wish they could go and wage jihad, how the jihadists are in the 
right, and then more mundane details simply telling about their lives or sharing 
information about their cats (Zelin 2013; Speri, 2014; Stone, 2014).ii  It is this network 
amongst actual jihadists, supporters, sympathizers, and simply those looking for a 
community or interested in the movement that makes Twitter such a valuable instrument 
for ISIS.  As items get retweeted, and more connections made, ISIS has the greater ability 
to expand their network beyond their own physical borders. 
In order to expand its network, ISIS not only uses Twitter but also “games” it.  
ISIS released an Arabic-language Twitter app known as The Dawn of Glad Tidings 
(supposedly defunct as of December 2014), that was readily available in the Google Play 
Store (Berger, 2014).  This app would post tweets to your account as well to the accounts 
15 
of all those who had signed up for the app.  The amount of tweets this one application 
sent out would cause some hashtags or Tweets to be “trending” on Twitter, and thus gain 
more attention and more followers.  On top of this, ISIS spaced out the tweets enough to 
avoid setting off Twitter’s spam-detection algorithms (Berger, 2014).  Spacing the tweets 
out, and developing the app to begin with, shows a high level of sophistication and 
knowledge of the programming behind Twitter itself.  Along with developing an app to 
game the infrastructure of Twitter, ISIS has also been known to hijack harmless hashtags 
and use them for their own propaganda.  Peter Van Praagh, president of the Halifax 
International Security Forum had to issue a statement on November 22, 2014, about 
ISIS’s hijacking of the Forum’s hastag “#HISF2014” (Van Praagh, 2014).  ISIS had used 
the hashtag to circulate a video of a British captive and to send messages to other 
participants and members of the Forum.  Hijacking hash tags, developing apps, and 
avoiding spam detection are signs that ISIS is well aware of the audience Twitter reaches 
as well as the infrastructure of Twitter itself
NOTES: 
i While Facebook was founded earlier than 2006, it only became open to the general 
public in 2006 (Facebook, 2014). 
ii It should be noted that while cats are considered “the social media cliché par 
excellence” (Speri, 2014), ISIS fighters and supporters most likely are trying to imitate 
Abu Huraira, a companion of the Prophet who had an extreme fondness for cats (al 
Janabi as cited by Speri, 2014).  Still, cats on a social media account are more likely to 
attract attention and draw people in than a picture of a gun.  




 This research used quantitative methods in order to answer the Research 
Questions.  Quantitative data allows for more accurate predications to be made and 
verified (Johnson & Christensen, 2013) while also adding to the larger picture of the 
overall data.  A quantitative approach also allows the research to gain a more clearly 
objective and statistically valid study (Anderson, 2006).  Due to the amount of data 
gathered, an overall quantitative approach was considered the best and most reliable 
method for gathering and studying the necessary data.  
Research Design 
 This research used data mining tools that allowed data to be collected directly 
from the source, in this case Twitter.  This kind of research design was best suited to 
collect this kind of data because it gave the researcher a chance to collect primary data 
directly from the online community without having to interact with individual Twitter 
users.  Since the research questions above are best answered by a bird’s eye view of the 
data, and not from one-on-one interaction, gaining the bigger picture was more important 
to the overall research.  The best way to gain this bigger picture was through Twitter’s 
own APIs, both streaming and search.  Through these APIs, the researcher was able to 
access a lot of data over different time periods and in reaction to different events.
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Sample Size and Sampling 
 The sample frame for this research was all Twitter users who tweeted a specific 
hashtag or keywords during a specified time frame in relation to a critical incident.  The 
time frame chosen was based on “critical incidents.”  Critical incident is a term that has 
been used over the past several decades to represent the psychological study of people 
and cultures (Flanagan, 1954), which is more formally known as the Critical Incident 
Technique.  More recently, the term has also been used for Critical Incident Analysis 
(CIA) (Schwester, 2011).  It is this last term that pertains to this research:  A critical 
incident is any event that creates a “theater of action,” to which individuals respond.  In 
this research, the critical incident pertains to any event that ISIS used to draw attention to 
themselves because this creates the “theater of action” as outlined by Schwester (2011).  
These incidents then spawned hashtags, keywords, or urls that ISIS members and 
supporters would then use to spread their propaganda through Tweets.  Since the data 
collected was in response to these critical incidents, there was no set sample size, only 
however much data could be collected through the Twitter APIs.  This response means 
that there are two constraints on the data:  1. The focus is on the response itself, not on a 
certain set of actors, and 2. The constraint on data collected by the APIs. 
 The sampling occurred by accessing both the Streaming and Search Twitter APIs 
and specifying the specific hashtags and keywords used by ISIS followers and supporters.  
Both APIs were used because the Streaming API can collect real-time data, but is unable 
to collect past data whereas the Search API can collect up to seven days worth of data. By 
having both APIs available, it means that a better overall and more precise collection of 
data could occur.  It also means that if the results from one API follow a pattern and then 
18 
the other API results follow the same pattern, there is a greater degree of certainty that 
the overall network structure follows a specific pattern.  If the results from the APIs are 
different, then more research will be needed to determine why there are differences and 
why these differences result in a different network structure for the same hashtags and 
keywords.  These hashtags and keywords were manually determined as videos or new 
propaganda was released through social media.  While some videos and materials were 
widely circulated among followers and supporters using certain keywords, others were 
hard to ascertain what the keyword or hashtag would be, causing a loss in data collection.  
O’Callaghan, Prucha, Greene, Conway, Carthy, and Cunningham (2014) acknowledge 
that for ongoing conflicts, especially those that are less established in terms of the actors, 
data is lacking in the phrases that groups consistently use to propagate their materials.  
This is especially true with ISIS followers and supporters who want to actively promote 
propaganda but also have to constantly bring their accounts back up when Twitter 
suspends them for their propaganda.  The sampling, and as a consequence, the sample 
population, are a direct result of the manually chosen keywords.  If the keyword chosen 
was not as popular with the followers and supporters as previous keywords, less data was 
collected.  A specific example of data collection process can be found in Appendix 1. 
Research Method 
Social Network Analysis 
To analyze the data gathered from ISIS’s propaganda on Twitter, the researcher 
used tools from Social Network Analysis.  Social Network Analysis is a type of study 
that seeks to determine and understand the underlying network structure within a social 
group (Scott, 2012).  It was not originally developed for technical platforms, but has 
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slowly evolved as a way to analysis big data that results from many social media 
platforms.  Social Network Analysis is best suited for data that arises from a “community 
structure,” and from “relational data” that shows connections from one member to 
another (Scott, 2012, p.3).  Twitter data fits into these categories because the 
communications show relation from one Twitter user to another, and it also shows the 
underlying community structure of the larger group.  Social Network Analysis looks at 
factors such as nodes, edges, centrality, and clustering, and uses mathematical algorithms 
and statistics to discover patterns made of these factors (Cook & Holder, 2006; Knoke, 
2008).  Using Social Network Analysis tools on ISIS Twitter propaganda data helped in 
answering the research questions relating to ISIS’s Twitter network. 
Research Tools 
 This research employed many tools in order to gain access to the necessary data, 
and then later for parsing and analysis.  The first tools used were the Twitter Streaming 
and Search APIs.  The Twitter Streaming API was accessed by using a Python library 
called Tweepy (Moujahid, 2014).  A Python script was created that imported the Tweepy 
library, authenticated and connected to the Twitter Streaming API, and filtered the 
Twitter Streams using specific keywords.  The filtered Twitter Streams return all 
matching Tweets as long as the volume of Tweets is below or equal to the streaming cap 
(Twitter, 2015).  This means that the Python script should return all tweets matching the 
specific keywords unless the volume is such that Twitter’s rate limits are breached.  
Research has shown that most Streaming API users are only receiving about 1% to 40% 
of all specified tweets (Bright Palnet, 2013).  The Twitter Streaming API is also only 
capable of collecting data as it happens.  This means that if someone’s tweet matched a 
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keyword, but it was tweeted before the Python script was set running, then that tweet will 
not be included in the final data collection from the Streaming API. 
 The Twitter Search API was accessed using NodeXL’s import Twitter data 
feature.  NodeXL, a free, open-source template for Microsoft Excel developed by the 
Social Media Research Foundation (2015), queries the Twitter Search API for specified 
keywords when the user chooses to import Twitter Search Data.  The Twitter Search API 
lacks the completeness of data from the Twitter Streaming API because it is focused on 
relevance not completeness (Twitter, 2015).  Due to this focus, less tweets will be 
gathered than even the Streaming API.  However, the Twitter Search API does allow for 
collection of data from up to 7 days previous to the search.  In practice, this means that an 
import Twitter search query run through NodeXL can produce older tweets than that 
found from the Twitter Streaming API.  Both of the APIs were used in an effort to gain a 
more complete picture of how ISIS spreads their propaganda on Twitter. 
 Other tools used were a Python script developed to parse through the data output 
from the Twitter Streaming API.  Since the Twitter Streaming API outputs it data in the 
JSON data format, it could not simply be opened in Excel and run through the NodeXL 
template.  Instead, the Python script searched each line of the JSON data, found the 
matches for a specific keyword, and then outputted that data to a text file.  This text file 
was then opened in Microsoft Excel, manually perused and formatted to ensure the 
highest quality of data, and then imported into NodeXL.  The data collected through 
NodeXL itself from the Twitter Search API was already formatted properly. 
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Data Analysis and Presentation 
 The collected data was analyzed using NodeXL’s built-in visualization features 
and mathematical formulas.  The data was analyzed using in-degree, out-degree, 
closeness centrality, and betweeness centrality.  Data is not only presented as these 
statistics but takes advantage of the visualization component built-in to NodeXL to 
visually represent the social network of ISIS’s followers and supporters.  The visual 
network along with the statistical metrics best represents the data necessary to answer the 
research questions about dissemination of data, centrality of nodes, and network 
structure.  The data metrics collected from each separate critical incident were compared 
to each other in order to see the overall network structure and to ascertain the 
dissemination of ISIS propaganda material.
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FINDINGS 
 The results from the Twitter data are broken down into three different critical 
incidents:  1. The beheading of Japanese Hostage, Kenji Goto, released January 31st, 
2015, 2. The burning alive of the Jordanian Pilot, Moaz al-Kasasbeh, released February 
3rd, 2015, and 3. The release of the online ISIS magazine, Dabiq, on February 12th, 2015.  
These three events represent critical incidents because they were catalysts for theaters of 
action and reaction (Schwester, 2011).  The first critical incident – the beheading of Kenji 
Goto – resulted in not only mass condemnation of ISIS from the nation of Japan and 
other allies but also resulted in mass suspension of pro-ISIS Twitter accounts by Twitter 
(Vocativ, 2015).  The immolation of Moaz al-Kasasbeh resulted in a further Twitter 
crackdown, and in the country of Jordan beginning airstrikes against ISIS territories 
(Broder, 2015).  Both of these events belong in the class of propaganda because ISIS 
used these events to show strength and might in order to motivate people towards their 
cause.  As Farwell (2012) notes, violent propaganda can be used to disturb a regime and 
show that victory is possible.  The violence is also being used by ISIS to show their 
“degree of zealotry” for bringing about a more perfect Islam (Hussein, as cited by Nissen, 
2014, p.2).  However, this violence has to be counter-balanced with a narrative of hope 
and substance (Farwell, 2012).  This hopeful narrative can be seen in the release of 
Dabiq.  Dabiq is a periodical magazine that focuses on life inside ISIS territory as well as 
on the ideology behind the formation of the Caliphate (The Clarion Project, 2014).  While 
boasting or dispensing words of wisdom, Dabiq’s overall goal is to paint a romantic
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portrait of what life inside the Caliphate can be, and to show how the Caliphate 
exemplifies the “utopian Muslim universalism” of original Islam (Hussein, as cited by 
Nissen, 2014, p.2).  This romantic portrait is then used to draw in people outside of the 
Caliphate borders and to get a larger audience to support ISIS’s ideology.  By focusing on 
two violent incidences and one non-violent incident, this research attempted to gain a 
better-rounded view of how ISIS disseminates their propaganda, both violent and 
hopeful.   
The critical incidents were further broken down into how information was 
gathered.  For Critical Incident 1, both the Streaming and Search APIs were used to 
collect data that matched the keyword “A message to the government of Japan.”  For 
Critical Incident 2, the Streaming API was used to collect data that matched the keyword 
“Healing of the Believers’ Chests.”  Finally, Critical Incident 3 was captured using the 
Search API through NodeXL. 
Measurements 
 In order to accurately report the findings, the measurements on the data should be 
discussed.  The measurements were collected using built-in features of NodeXL.  The 
metrics used to analyze the data include:  In-degree, Out-degree, Betweenness Centrality, 
and Closeness Centrality.  These three metrics have arisen from network analysis as a 
way to best get at the nodes that are more central than others (Freeman, 1978).   
Degree Centrality 
Both in-degree and out-degree are measures of connections between two vertices 
(nodes) within the data.  In-degree measures the amount of connections that point 
towards (inward to) a vertex (Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010).  For Twitter data, 
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this in-degree measures how many tweets are directed at a person.  This direction can 
include a reply-to or mention from one user to another.  If @sally1234 mentions 
@bob5678, then @bob5678 has an in-degree of 1 because he has received a connection 
that points towards him.  Out-degree measures the opposite of in-degree in that it counts 
how many times a connection starts at a vertex and points outwards towards other 
vertices (Hansen et al., 2010).  For Twitter data, this means tweets going out from the 
original user.  In the example given above, @sally1234 would have an out-degree of 1 
because she tweeted from herself to @bob5678.  The point originated with her vertex 
point and then connected to the other vertex.  For tweets that are not directed at anybody 
and only originate from the source, the in-degree and out-degree will be equal.  This 
means that if @sally1234 had simply tweeted a message with not mention or reply to 
another Twitter user, then her in-degree and out-degree score would both be 1. 
Betweenness Centrality 
 Betweenness centrality measures how central a node is to a network by computing 
“how often a given vertex lies on the shortest path between two other vertices” (Hansen 
et al., 2010, p.40; Newman, 2003).  The final betweenness score will show how important 
a particular node is to the network because it shows how strong of a bridge it is for 
information to pass through.  If a node has a particularly high betweenness score, then 
that means that it is a very strong bridge within the network; it helps to connect nodes to 
each other in order to continue passing along information.  A node with a high 
betweenness score may act as a “gatekeeper” (Bruggeman, 2013, p.133) because 
information diffuses through it.   
Closeness Centrality 
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 Closeness centrality measures how close one vertex is to other vertices by 
averaging the distance between a vertex and all the other vertices in the network (Hansen 
et al., 2010; Okamoto, Chen, & Li, 2008).  There are different algorithms for closeness 
centrality with the “simple closeness” being simply the inverse measure of centrality 
(Bruggeman, 2013).  This means that the larger a number, the further away from the 
center it is.  “Normalized closeness” attempts to make the range of closeness be from 0 to 
1 in order to correlate larger values with greater centrality.  NodeXL’s equation for 
closeness centrality normalizes the closeness, but it keeps with the smaller number being 
more centrally located instead of taking the inverse (Hansen et al., 2010).  
Critical Incident 1 
 Critical Incident 1 refers to the release of footage showing the beheading of 
Japanese hostage Kenji Goto.  The video was released by Al-Furquan Media, the known 
media wing of ISIS, on January 31st, 2015.  The researcher reviewed Twitter accounts of 
stated ISIS affiliates and determined that “A message to the government of Japan” was 
being used as a pro-ISIS phrase for the dissemination of the video.   
Streaming API 
 After the key phrase was determined, the researcher then inputted this key phrase 
into the Python API script and set the script to running.  The script ran for over 48 hours, 
however, after the initial 48 hours, the key phrase had been picked up by media and was 
resulting in irrelevant data.  Thus the results for the Streaming API are for a 48-hour span 
starting at 5:15pm on January 31st, 2015. 
 The script for the Streaming API resulted in 644 vertices (nodes) with 600 unique 
edges (relationships), 69 edges with duplicates (meaning the vertices tweeted along the 
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same path), and a total of 669 total edges.  There were also 251 self-loops, which occur 
when a user tweets without replying to or mentioning another user so it simply forms a 
self-loop of input-output. 
In-Degree.  The top 20 users with the highest In-Degree Centrality were chosen 
for representation.  These are the users that tweeted the most information out to other 
people. 
Table 1 



























Out-Degree.  The top 20 users with the highest Out-Degree Centrality were 
chosen for representation.  These are the users that received the most tweets from other 
users. 
Table 2 































Betweenness Centrality.  The top 20 users with the highest Betweenness 
Centrality Score were chosen for representation.  These are the users that acted most as 
gatekeepers and bridges for the information.  The higher their betweenness score, the 
more data that passes through them. 
Table 3 
Highest Betweenness Centrality Amongst Twitter Streaming API Results for Critical Incident 1 























The influence of these vertices can be seen in Figure 1.  The solid circle represents user 
Abdul_aliy_3, who has the highest betweenness centrality score.  The solid diamonds 
represent the rest of the top 20 as well as any users who have a between centrality score 
of greater than 1.  All other users have an empty circle. 
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Figure 1.Visualization of the betweenness centrality scores for Critical Incident 1 using 
the Twitter Streaming API.  This figure illustrates the highest betweenness centrality 
scores amongst the data.  
As seen in Figure 1, the nodes with the highest betweenness centrality scores help 
to connect other nodes to each other.  They represent the center of a hub through which 
information flows.  And, while there is a highest betweenness centrality score, there are 
other nodes that act as hubs for other users.  
Closeness Centrality.  Closeness centrality is not a metric that can accurately be 
depicted simply by showing the top 20 users with the lowest metric score.  All of the top 
20 would have a closeness centrality score of 0 because it was a tweet from the user to 
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nobody else.  It was not a mention or reply to, so there is no other vertex for which the 
originating vertex to be close.  The best way to show closeness centrality is to show the 
overall metrics for the network. 
Table 4 
Overall Scores for Closeness Centrality for Critical Incident 1 From the Twitter Streaming API 
Type Result 
Minimum Closeness Centrality 0.000 
Maximum Closeness Centrality 1.000 
Average Closeness Centrality 0.133 
Median Closeness Centrality 0.010 
 
 Results for Critical Incident 1, Streaming API.  The results from the measures 
of centrality show that those with the largest In-Degree scores (Table 1) correspond to 
those with the largest betweenness scores (Table 3), and that the network overall is fairly 
close together with an average closeness centrality score of .133 (Table 4).  The 2 users 
with the highest in-degree scores also have the 2 highest betweenness scores.  Based on 
what each of these measures of centrality mean, it points towards these two users being 
the bridges through which most information passes.  User Abdul_aliy_3 only tweeted out 
once, but this tweet was then taken up and mentioned in 77 other tweets.  This points 
towards Abdul_aliy_3 being someone important within the network structure, or at least 
someone who is able to get information more quickly than some of the others. 
 Figure 1 visualizes how these most-connected nodes work together to form the 
overall network structure.  The solid diamonds represent the nodes with higher 
betweeness scores, and the solid circle represents the user with the highest betweenness 
score, user Abdul_aliy_3.  Many of the users with high betweenness scores appear to be 
very connected with the center few being more closely connected than those along the 
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periphery.  Figure 1 also shows that the network is close together.  With an average 
closeness score of .133, the overall distance of path for each user is short.  Many of the 
users are close to the central hubs of information. 
 For this network, tweeting a lot (which results in a higher in-degree) did not 
matter as much as how often one of the user’s tweet was mentioned (resulting in a higher 
out-degree).  This pattern means that one tweet from a well-placed user is more important 
to the dissemination of information than having multiple users tweet the same thing and 
then never having that message picked up, as can be seen with the number of self-loops 
that go nowhere and do not add to the overall information structure.   
Search API 
 The Search API was accessed using NodeXL’s import from Twitter feature.  It 
searched for the key phrase, “A Message to the Government of Japan,” and was limited 
to just over 150,000 tweets.  The import was started a little after 6pm on January 31st, 
2015, and ran until mid-afternoon the next day. 
The import from the Twitter Search API resulted in 595 vertices (nodes) with 
1595 unique edges (relationships), 116 edges with duplicates (meaning the vertices 






In-Degree.  The top 20 users with the highest In-Degree Centrality were chosen 
for representation.  These are the users that tweeted the most information out to other 
people. 
Table 5 





























Out-Degree.  The top 20 users with the highest Out-Degree Centrality were 
chosen for representation.  These are the users that received the most tweets from other 
users. 
Table 6 





























Betweenness Centrality.  The top 20 users with the highest Betweenness 
Centrality Score were chosen for representation.  These are the users that acted most as 
gatekeepers and bridges for the information.  The higher their betweenness score, the 
more data that passes through them. 
Table 7 
Highest Betweenness Centrality Amongst Twitter Search API Results for Critical Incident 1 

























Figure 2.  Visualization of the betweenness centrality scores for Critical Incident 1 using 
the Twitter Search API.  This figure illustrates the highest betweenness centrality scores 
amongst the data. 
Closeness Centrality.  Closeness centrality is not a metric that can accurately be 
depicted simply by showing the top 20 users with the lowest metric score.  All of the top 
20 would have a closeness centrality score of 0 because it was a tweet from the user to 
nobody else.  It was not a mention or reply to, so there is no other vertex for which the 
originating vertex to be close.  The best way to show closeness centrality is to show the 
overall metrics for the network. 
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Table 8 
Overall Scores for Closeness Centrality for Critical Incident 1 From the Twitter Search API 
Metric Results 
Minimum Closeness Centrality 0.000 
Maximum Closeness Centrality 1.000 
Average Closeness Centrality 0.024 
Median Closeness Centrality 0.000 
 
Results for Critical Incident 1, Search API.  This network differs from the 
Streaming API results to Critical Incident 1 in that both in-degree (Table 5) and out-
degree (Table 6) matter when it comes to having a higher betweenness score (Table 7).  
Both the highest-ranked user for in-degree and the highest-ranked user for out-degree 
appear in the top 20 betweenness centrality scores.  User mezzni07 (the user with the 
highest out-degree score at 92) still had a higher betweenness score than those users with 
high in-degree scores, but the overall results are not as cut and dry as those from the 
Streaming API for Critical Incident 1.  This means there was an overall larger flow of 
information with many of the information gatekeepers being originators of information 
(in-degree) just as much as they were receivers of information (out-degree).   
This more consistent in-and-out flow of information amongst sets of the same 
users also results in a lower average closeness centrality score of .024 (Table 8).  This is 
visible in Figure 2 because the network as a whole appears more tightly clustered 
together.  In Figure 2, the solid diamonds represent the users with higher betweenness 
scores with the larger the diamond correlating with the larger betweenness score.  The 
largest solid diamond is user mezzni07 with a betweenness score of 94597.103. 
This network pattern means that users who both tweet themselves and then have 
those tweets picked up in mentions and reply-tos are just as important as those that 
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receive all the mentions and reply-tos.  In this network, information is passed back and 
forth rather than just picked up and carried on as in the network for Critical Incident 1, 
Streaming API.  While the networks between Streaming API and Search API are similar 
in vertices size (644 and 595), the search API resulted in a larger overall-connected 
network structure with 1711 edges compared to only 669 from the Streaming API.  These 
results may have occurred because the Search API was able to pick up more tweets right 
at the start of the critical incident since it is capable of going up to 7 days in the past 
while the Streaming API was only able to pick up tweets once the script was started, and 
even then, it had to abide by the rate limits resulting in a loss of information. 
Critical Incident 2 
Critical Incident 2 refers to the release of footage showing the immolation of 
Jordanian hostage Moaz al-Kasasbeh .  The video was released by Al-Furquan Media on 
February 3rd, 2015.  The researcher reviewed Twitter accounts of stated ISIS affiliates 
and determined that “Healing the Believers’ Chest” was being used as a pro-ISIS phrase 
for the dissemination of the video. 
Streaming API 
After the key phrase was determined, the researcher inputted the key phrase into 
the script and ran the script for the next 4 days.  The script was started at 6pm on 
February 3rd, 2015.  This was a small time after the video had been released, but the 
researcher was unable to remotely access the script and set it running.  Even though the 
script ran for 4 days, not as many tweets were picked up as for the Japanese hostage. 
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The script for the Streaming API resulted in 45 vertices (nodes) with 40 unique 
edges (relationships), 6 edges with duplicates (meaning the vertices tweeted along the 
same path), and a total of 46 edges.  There were also 12 self-loops. 
In-Degree.  Due to the smaller amount of vertices, only the top 10 users with the 
highest In-Degree Centrality were chosen for representation.  These are the users that 
tweeted the most information out to other people. 
Table 9 






















Out-Degree.  Due to the smaller amount of vertices, only the top 10 users with 
the highest Out-Degree Centrality were chosen for representation.  These are the users 
that received the most tweets from other users. 
Table 10 


























Betweenness Centrality.  The top 10 users with the highest Betweenness 
Centrality Score were chosen for representation.  These are the users that acted most as 
gatekeepers and bridges for the information.  The higher their betweenness score, the 
more data that passes through them. 
Table 11 
Highest Betweenness Centrality Amongst Twitter Streaming API Results for Critical Incident 2 















Figure 3.  Visualization of the betweenness centrality scores for Critical Incident 2 using 
the Twitter Streaming API.  This figure illustrates the highest betweenness centrality 
scores amongst the data. 
Closeness Centrality.  Closeness centrality is not a metric that can accurately be 
depicted simply by showing the top 10 users with the lowest metric score.  All of the top 
10 would have a closeness centrality score of 0 because it was a tweet from the user to 
nobody else.  It was not a mention or reply to, so there is no other vertex for which the 
originating vertex to be close.  The best way to show closeness centrality is to show the 




Overall Scores for Closeness Centrality for Critical Incident 2 From the Twitter Streaming API 
User Closeness Centrality 
Score 
Minimum Closeness Centrality 0.000 
Maximum Closeness Centrality 1.000 
Average Closeness Centrality 0.210 
Median Closeness Centrality 0.022 
 
Results for Critical Incident 2, Streaming API.  These results show that the 
user with the highest in-degree score (Table 9) resulted in the highest bewteenness score 
(Table 11).  However, this network was also not as tightly-knit as the other previous two.  
With an average closeness centrality score of .210 (Table 12), the users are not very far 
away, but they are still further away from each other than those in Critical Incident 1. 
This network pattern shows that much of the information is disseminated through 
one user, 9ariban_9ariban tweeting out to other users.  The visualization in Figure 3 uses 
solid diamonds that correspond in size to higher betweenness scores.  As seen in Figure 
3, there is really only one user with a high betweenness score and the other users seem to 
exist only on the periphery.  There does not appear to be overall much interaction 
amongst the users.  This network is also much smaller than the other 3 considered in this 
section.  Even though the Streaming script ran for the same, if not more, time than the 
Streaming script for Critical Incident 1, there was just not as much happening on Twitter.  
There could be a few reasons for this.  One, this came on the tail end of Critical Incident 
1 with the two overlapping in time.  Since Critical Incident 1 was a bigger media event, it 
could have impacted how focused ISIS supporters were on any other events.  Secondly, 
the researcher could have chosen the wrong key phrase.  If ISIS supporters started to use 
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another key phrase to spread their news, then the script would not have picked that phrase 
up, resulting in a loss of information.  Third, not long after the release of the immolation 
video, King Abdullah II vowed a “relentless war” against ISIS (aawsat.net, 2015).  The 
video was released on February 3rd, 2015, and soon after the release news began 
circulating that Jordan would probably react in a strong way to the video.  This news, and 
a possible impending airstrike from the country of Jordan, may have been more at the top 
of ISIS supporters’ minds than simply spreading the video.  All three of these reasons 
could have resulted in an overall smaller network.  
Critical Incident 3 
Critical Incident 3 refers to the release of ISIS’s English-language magazine, 
Dabiq.  The magazine was released online on February 12th, 2015 (talkleft.com, 2015).  
Its title was “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy:  The Extinction of the Grayzone,” and it 
included an interview with British hostage John Cantile.  It also featured an interview 
with Hayat Boumeddience, the wife of Amedy Coulibaly, the Paris kosher supermarket 
attacker (pjmedia.com, 2015).  The researcher reviewed the news releases and then 
searched through Twitter to see how the pro-ISIS cohort was spreading the news of the 
release.  “Dabiq” appeared to be the way most pro-ISIS supporters were spreading the 
news.   
Search API 
 After the keyword was determined, the researcher waited 24 hours, until February 
13th 2015, to input the keyword into the “import Twitter data” feature in NodeXL.  This 
feature backends into Twitter’ Search API and can find data from the last 7 days.  The 
reason for waiting 24 hours was to allow more information to disseminate across Twitter.  
44 
Once the data collection process was through, the researcher noticed there were a lot of 
false positives in the data.  The Twitter user would use the term “Dabiq,” but would only 
be reporting it from a news agency standpoint, or in some cases, as outrage that the 
magazine had been released at all.  To remove these false positives, the researcher filtered 
the results to only those that used an archive.org url within their post.  Since the magazine 
is inflammatory and acts a terrorist handbook in many ways, most sites block access to 
the link once the site releases what it actually is.  This mean that any links of the 
magazine on Twitter had a greater chance of becoming broken links once the website 
hosting the magazine realized what they were hosting.  Archive.org archives most things 
on the internet, and the link to the magazine was one of those things.  The researcher had 
seen that Archive.org had been used previously by pro-ISIS groups on Twitter to ensure 
the links they send to each other are not broken.  The researcher also noted that 
journalists and other anti-ISIS supporters appeared less likely to use archive.org as a url 
to show video or stills footage.  Many journalists would use images or stills associated 
with their own news agency, and many anti-ISIS supporters were more likely to use these 
images rather than using ones likely to be pulled down by a social media site.  By 
filtering the results of the Search API to only include urls that link back to Archive.org, 
the researcher was able to remove many false positives and focus the data set more on 
actual ISIS supporters. 
 The import results from the Search API resulted in 361 vertices (nodes) with 287 
unique edges (relationships), 193 edges with duplicates (meaning the vertices tweeted 




In-Degree.  The top 20 users with the highest In-Degree Centrality were chosen 
for representation.  These are the users that tweeted the most information out to other 
people. 
Table 13 





























Out-Degree.  The top 20 users with the highest Out-Degree Centrality were 
chosen for representation.  These are the users that received the most tweets from other 
users. 
Table 14 































Betweenness Centrality.  The top 20 users with the highest Betweenness 
Centrality Score were chosen for representation.  These are the users that acted most as 
gatekeepers and bridges for the information.  The higher their betweenness score, the 
more data that passes through them. 
Table 15 
Highest Betweenness Centrality Amongst Twitter Search API Results for Critical Incident 3 

























Figure 4.  Visualization of the betweenness centrality scores for Critical Incident 3 using 
the Twitter Search API.  This figure illustrates the highest betweenness centrality scores 
amongst the data. 
Closeness Centrality.  Closeness centrality is not a metric that can accurately be 
depicted simply by showing the top 20 users with the lowest metric score.  All of the top 
20 would have a closeness centrality score of 0 because it was a tweet from the user to 
nobody else.  It was not a mention or reply to, so there is no other vertex for which the 
originating vertex to be close.  The best way to show closeness centrality is to show the 




Overall Scores for Closeness Centrality for Critical Incident 3 From the Twitter Search API 
Metric Result 
Minimum Closeness Centrality 0.000 
Maximum Closeness Centrality 1.000 
Average Closeness Centrality 0.321 
Median Closeness Centrality 0.059 
 
Results for Critical Incident 3, Search API.  The results from this Critical 
Incident closely resemble the results from Critical Incident 1, Search API.  The user with 
the highest betweenness score (Table 15) correlates with the user with the highest in-
degree score (Table 13).  However, the high betweenness scores also include users that 
had high out-degree scores (Table 14).  Again, like Critical Incident 1, Search API, the 
user who tweets the most to other people is the one who is the most like a gatekeeper of 
information within the network structure. 
A striking difference between Critical Incident 3, Search API and Critical Incident 
1, Search API is the closeness of the network.  Critical Incident 1, Search API had an 
extremely close network with an average closeness centrality score of .024 (Table 8).  
Critical Incident 3, Search API, has a much higher closeness score with the average 
closeness centrality being .321 (Table 16).  This means the overall network for this 
critical incident is not as close together as the other network patterns. 
Figure 4 depicts the network graph with the solid diamonds representing high 
betweenness scores.  The higher score, the bigger the solid diamond is.  One can see that 
the user with the highest betweenness score (shoutussalam) is the main hub for 
information with smaller betweenness scores circling around him and then further away 
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from the main core larger betweenness scores start to appear as these users connect those 
in the middle to those more on the periphery. 
The network pattern for Critical Incident 3, Search API shows a more back-and-
forth flow of information between users.  With both high in-degree and high out-degree 
users appearing in the high betweenness table (Table 15), the gatekeepers, and thus the 
central nodes of information, are both users that tweet out data and users that are simply 
mentioned in other tweets.  This ebb and flow of information also expands out to more 
distant nodes as shown with the average closeness centrality score of .321.  These results 
may differ from the other critical incidents because it offers “positive propaganda” as 
opposed to the violent imagery depicted in the other three.  The magazine may attract 
more casual ISIS supporters than the violent imagery that likely appeals to a smaller, 




 The findings stated above will be used in this section to answer and support 
responses to the research questions mentioned at the beginning of the paper.  All of the 
support questions will be answered with the hopes of identifying an answer for the 
overarching question of:  How does ISIS’s Twitter network affect the dissemination of its 
propaganda? 
 One of the main points affecting the configuration of the network will be the node 
or nodes of centrality.  When all the measures of centrality are gathered together, they 
still point towards only one main node within the network.  But, while there is still one 
“main” node in the network, it is not a centralized (sometimes referred to as a “wheel”) 
network (Blum & Dudley, 2001), in which there is one main node that outputs 
information to all the other nodes.  Nor is it a “Y” network in which there is one main 
node that then has branches to different points that end up forming a Y shape (Bokdia, 
2008).  Instead, the dissemination of ISIS propaganda on Twitter results in a node that is 
slightly more central than others, but then the network continues to produce other central 
nodes that connect to other users.   
In addition to this, not all of these main nodes are necessarily outputting a large 
degree of information.  As seen in Critical Incidence 1, Streaming API, the user that has 
the highest degree of betweenness centrality and who also appears at the center of the 
network in Figure 2 only tweeted once.  It was the other users around this person that 
picked up the tweet and started sending the tweet to others while mentioning the author
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of the original tweet.  This means the originator of the tweet ended up in the center of the 
network because of the nodes around him, not because of his own continuous output.  
This did not remain the same in other networks.  The other critical incidences showed 
either a correlation of betweeenness with in-degree score, or as the case in the bigger 
networks, a more even balance between in-degree, out-degree, and the overall 
betweenness score.  This shows that the main nodes in the network were mostly 
facilitators of information by providing some information and then being used as an 
authority figure for others to output the information to other Twitter users.  For the most 
part, the central users (nodes) were not simply figures who constantly tweeted out to 
others, but instead, were figures that acted as connectors to other users.  This means that 
while each network had a more “central” node, they facilitated the conversation around 
them and were, in fact, supported by other nodes that continued the flow of information 
gained from the center.  These other hubs were essential to continuing the spread of 
ISIS’s propaganda, and in fact, result in the overall network structure of ISIS’s Twitter 
network being a “scale-free network.” 
 The discovery of the central hubs creates a scale-free network because the 
multiple nodes responsible for centrally disseminating ISIS information form what 
Barabasi and Bonabeau (2003) call hubs.  These hubs are often part of the “scale-free 
network” (Barabasi & Bonabeau, 2003).  A scale-free network follows a power law in 
that their degree distribution (the connectivity of their nodes) follows a power law (Li, 
Alderson, Doyle, & Willinger, 2006).  These networks will have no natural number of 
edges (relationships between vertices), and instead can continue to grow as more and 
more nodes are added, thus they continue to scale in size.  Barabasi and Albert (1999) 
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introduced the idea of scale-free networks in 1999 in reaction to the relationship they saw 
when studying the network structure of the World Wide Web.  This structure occurs not 
only on the internet but also in nature, business, and other areas of study (Barabasi & 
Bonabeau, 2003).  Different researchers have used different metrics and calculations to 
determine whether or not a network’s degree distribution follows a power law (Mislove, 
Marcon, Gummadi, Druschel, Bhattacharjee, 2007; Ravid & Rafaeli, 2004; Wang & 
Chen, 2003.)  For this research, the researcher found it best to use Ravid and Rafeli’s 
(2004) method of using frequency versus degree in order to determine if the network 
followed a power law distribution.  This method was chosen because it could use data 
already in NodeXL without having to use a more advanced social network analysis tool. 
Power Law Distribution for Critical Incidents 
 Critical Incident 1, Streaming API.  Figure 5 shows that the Distribution of the 
In-Degree for Critical Incident 1, Streaming API, follows a power law.  This means that 
there are a lot of low in-degrees up front, but then it slowly evens out with a few high in-
degree users at the tail end.  Figure 6 for out-degree does not directly follow a power law 
because the users with high out-degree scores does not spike.  
  
Figure 5.  Plot chart showing In-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 1, Streaming 















Figure 6.  Plot chart showing Out-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 1, Streaming 
API.  This chart illustrates the lack of a curve of Out-Degree Distribution for Critical 
Incident 1, Search API. 
Critical Incident 1, Search API.  Figure 7 shows that the Distribution of the In-
Degree for Critical Incident 1, Search API, follows a power law.  This means that there 
are a lot of low in-degrees up front, but then it slowly evens out with a few high in-degree 
users at the tail end.  Figure 8 for out-degree also follows a power law because the users 
with low out-degree are all up front, and then the few with high out-degree are at the end. 
 
Figure 7.  Plot chart showing In-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 1, Search API.  

























Figure 8.  Plot chart showing Out-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 1, Search API.  
This chart illustrates the tail of Out-Degree Distribution for Critical Incident 1, Search 
API. 
Critical Incident 2, Streaming API.  Critical Incident 2 had the lowest amount 
of user tweets in its results.  This may have caused the differences in the graphs below.  
Figure 9 shows somewhat of a power law with a tail at the end that contains the users 
with a high score for in-degree and then the spike at the beginning of the graph for users 
that had low scores of in-degree.  Figure 10 is an outlier from the rest of the network 
graphs.  It shows a spike at the end of the graph which means there were a lot of users 
with a higher out-degree score.  This may be explained by the fact that all the nodes in 
this network had an out-degree score of 0 or 1.  This would explain the spike once the 


























Figure 9.  Plot chart showing In-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 2, Streaming 
API.  This chart illustrates the tail of In-Degree Distribution for Critical Incident 2, 
Streaming API. 
. 
Figure 10.  Plot chart showing In-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 2, Search API.  
This chart illustrates the In-Degree Distribution for Critical Incident 2, Search API. 
Critical Incident 3, Search API.  Figure 11 shows that the Distribution of the In-
Degree for Critical Incident 3, Search API, follows a power law.  This means that there 
are a lot of low in-degrees up front, but then it slowly evens out with a few high in-degree 
users at the tail end.  Figure 12 for out-degree does not fit into the exact power law model 
because it spikes near the front instead of following more of a curve patter.  This means 
that more users have a mid-range out-degree score than a low-score.  There are a few 


























Figure 11.  Plot chart showing In-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 3, Search API.  
This chart illustrates the tail of In-Degree Distribution for Critical Incident 3, Search API. 
. 
Figure 12.  Plot chart showing Out-Degree Distribution of Critical Incident 3, Search 
API.  This chart illustrates the spike of Out-Degree Distribution for Critical Incident 3, 
Search API. 
Overall Results.  The overall results from all of the critical incident networks seem to 
show that the larger network does have similarities with the scale-free network structure.  
Not every graph exactly followed this pattern, but most did, and the few that did not 
closely resemble the pattern had other factors affecting it (Figures 9 and 10 with such a 
low node count).  The multiple nodes of centrality do, in fact, affect ISIS’s overall 
network structure, and they cause the network structure to take on the properties of a 
scale-free network. 
 Since ISIS’s Twitter network structure does have properties related to a scale-free 
network, this does affect the overall dissemination of its propaganda on Twitter.  One of 
the main areas it affects is its ability to continue disseminating information even in the 
face of attack.  One of the main qualities of a scale-free network is that it is resilient to 
random attacks (Barabasi & Bonabeau, 2003).  Because of the many hubs of information 












inherent failure or through attack, and the network as a whole will fill in the gap quickly 
and continue on.  This resilience has been seen within the ISIS Twitter network already.  
On the same day ISIS released the video showing the beheading of hostage Kenji Goto, 
Twitter went on a widespread crackdown.  This crackdown resulted in thousands of 
accounts being suspended.  However, as the results to Critical Incident One in the 
Methodology section above show, ISIS supporters were quick to rebound and get back to 
spreading their propaganda.  While the researcher was reviewing Twitter results on 
January 31st, 20015, ISIS supporters were boasting about being suspended and coming 
back so quickly in order to continue spreading information.  Many users bragged about 
coming back from suspension and spread the beheading link all in the same tweet.  The 
overall ISIS Twitter network is too resilient and robust to simply be taken down by 
random suspensions. 
 Another example of how the network affects dissemination is in its ability to grow 
and increase its output of propaganda on Twitter.  The premise behind a scale-free 
network is that it can grow without destroying network communication (Hein, Schwind, 
& Konig, 2006).  This growth is supported by the probability of new hubs connecting to 
older, more well-established hubs.  Furthermore, this growth can occur in an evolutionary 
pattern, unlike random networks (also called ER networks) that start out with a fixed 
number of nodes (Hein et al., 2006).  While studying the evolution of genes, 
Willeboordse (2006) noted that a scale-free network supports diversity and 
reproducibility, and that this helps to create an overall stronger network.  These same two 
traits also hold true for a social media network in that the scale-free network makes it 
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easier for new nodes to connect to the network enhancing reproduction and diversity of 
the overall communication network.   
For ISIS, the ability to grow and evolve all while resisting being taken down by 
an attack is exactly what their Twitter media plan is meant to do.  ISIS has obviously 
made their media plan a top priority.  By crafting their network – inherently or not – in 
such a way that it can easily grow while at the same time resist attacks and Twitter 
suspensions, ISIS continues to be a force on Twitter. 
A scale-free network also supports the content of the spread of propaganda.  
Scale-free networks tend to be homogenous in thought and easily influenced by the main 
hubs.  Hein et al. (2006) discovered this when they set up a simulation of a scale-free 
network of security traders.  According to Hein et al. (2006), information about stocks 
spread “like an epidemic” through the scale-free network, but it was directly influenced 
by the opinion of the main hubs (p.273).  Other agents would change their decision based 
on any and all changes instituted by the power hubs.  This resulted in heavy fluctuation 
within the simulated market because once an opinion came from a power hub, the whole 
market would change its opinion.  For ISIS, this means that it is not easy to express 
individual opinions and then have these opinions taken up by the overall network. 
The particular implications of the scale-free network structure for ISIS are that it 
can resist attack, continue to easily grow and scale, maintain control of content, and it can 
continue to connect with users who are not necessarily current ISIS supporters.  The 
central nodes in each hub act as gatekeepers for the information.  This conversation 
between gatekeeper and other nodes allows for current supporters to gain information 
while also allowing more users to be brought into the fold.  By allowing increased output 
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and enabling evolutionary growth (Willeboordse, 2006), ISIS’s Twitter network can not 
only be effective at outputting information but also at continuing to grow the network.  
The whole point of ISIS’s propaganda is to attract reaction, and by attracting reaction, to 
gain supporters.  By easily allowing growth, resisting attacks, and maintaining overall 
content, the ISIS Twitter network is highly effective at spreading propaganda and thus 
growing its overall support networks.
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 CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 This study sought to answer the overall question of how ISIS’s Twitter network 
configuration affects the dissemination of its propaganda.  By focusing on the nodes of 
centrality, the role of these nodes in dissemination of information, and the overall 
network structure formed by these nodes, the researcher was able to come to the 
conclusion that this particular network (ISIS’s propaganda network) forms a scale-free 
network.  This scale-free network means that there are multiple hubs that each have one 
centralized node, and that these hubs are then connected to each other.  This type of 
network is not a completely centralized network like a Wheel or a Y network, but instead, 
it is more decentralized and offers more affordances for the purpose of spreading 
propaganda.  The affordances of this network to ISIS in their purpose of distributing 
propaganda are resilience, growth, and uniformity.  The scale-free network allows the 
overall Twitter propaganda network to resist random attacks, continue to grow and add 
new users to older, well-maintained central hubs, and to ensure that the propaganda 
released and disseminated aligns with ISIS’s overall ideology and media strategy.  
Understanding this overall network and its affordances is important because ISIS 
represents a more advanced threat on social media, and learning the ins and outs of this 
threat can help to come up with ways to fight it (Berger & Morgan, 2015).  While the 
research in this paper is specific to ISIS, other terrorists groups will likely learn from 
ISIS’s successful campaign and will start to place more attention on social media 
platforms.  Learning ISIS’s network can help provide a baseline for other terrorists
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groups on social media, and it may eventually help with keeping these groups from 
disseminating their propaganda on these platforms.  Knowledge of ISIS’s Twitter 
network can help provide a key to stopping not only them but also others that are likely to 
follow in their path. 
Implications for Practice 
 This study presents an overall view of ISIS’s Twitter network.  This view can be 
used in practice to help defeat ISIS on Twitter.  The only true way to stop ISIS from 
spreading their propaganda across the Twitter network would be to prevent ISIS and their 
supporters from posting on Twitter at all.  Unfortunately, this is highly unlikely to happen 
because ISIS supporters have shown how adept they are at getting around censorship.  
Another option would be to use the Achilles’ Heel of the scale-free network.  While a 
scale-free network is resilient to random attacks, its “Achilles’ Heel” (Barabasi 
&Bonabeau, 2003) is its inability to withstand a targeted attack.  When the attack is 
random, it is likely that only the smaller hubs will be taken out, and these smaller hubs 
are easily replaced.  But, if a targeted attack hits the main hubs, this makes it harder for 
the network to bounce back.  For ISIS, as long as Twitter just keeps suspending random 
followers, their network will be okay and will continue in its ability to grow and evolve. 
Right now, Twitter has suspended at least 1,000 accounts between September and 
December of last year (Gladstone & Goel, 2015), and probably another 2,000 or more in 
the last few weeks (Ross, Meek, & Ferran, 2015), but these suspensions have done little 
to slow down the overall network.  Twitter is likely just shutting down accounts that 
show support for ISIS without identifying how connected these accounts are to other 
accounts.  If Twitter or other intelligence agencies with the capability to study such large 
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data sets could pinpoint some of the hubs of the ISIS Twitter network, and then all at 
once take down those central hubs, it would make it harder for ISIS to come back as 
quickly as they have done before.  Repeatedly removing the central hubs of the network 
should slow down how quickly they can disseminate their propaganda. 
 Another implication of the network structure that could be used to eventually stop 
ISIS on Twitter is the ability to use misdirection.  Since the scale-free network is 
dependent upon the opinions of the few hubs, if the opinion of those power hubs changes, 
then the overall network could possibly change as well.  This would obviously require a 
lot of work behind the scenes from government agencies, but it is a tactic that has proven 
to work in the past for physical warfare and is coming to the rise in cyber warfare 
(Breuer, 2002; Carr, 2011).  Misdirection, the art of disguising true intentions in order to 
gain an advantage, has been used for centuries with some of the biggest examples coming 
in World War II with the misdirection projects used by the Allies to make the Luftwaffe 
waste many bombs on empty fields (Breuer, 2002).  The most anecdotal example of 
misdirection is the Trojan Horse; manipulate people into thinking one thing in order to 
gain entry and complete the initiative.  Misdirection is also being used by cyber criminals 
(ThreatMetrix.com, 2013) and even, supposedly, by countries such as the Russian 
Federation (Carr, 2011). If the power hubs of ISIS supporters were manipulated into 
tweeting out something that may not necessarily support – or help strengthen – the 
overall network, then that opinion would begin to spread throughout the whole network, 
and this could possibly make changes to the overall opinion and ideology of the network.  
While this type of cyber misdirection against a terrorist organization has not been done 
(openly, at least), it would attack the scale-free network at one of its weak points. 
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Limitations  
 There were limitations to what data the researcher was able to collect.  As 
mentioned above, the Twitter APIs only collect a certain amount data, so the researcher 
was unable to acquire 100% of all tweets matching a specific keyword.  The research 
could also only match keywords that were English because of the lack of knowledge 
about the Arabic language.  This presented a special limitation because many tweets 
would have the keyword in English but the rest of the tweet text would be in Arabic.  
These tweets were considered because the keyword or hashtag itself was in English and 
was readable by the researcher.  Due to this, only the keyword or hashtag was considered 
when collecting data.  There may have been more propaganda information in the rest of 
the tweet, but only the English keywords and hashtags mattered. 
 Time was also a limiting factor.  The Python script did not automatically start 
itself when an incident occurred.  The researcher had to ascertain what keywords would 
be most worthwhile to use, input them into the script, and then set the script running.  
Because of this, there is no certainty that the beginning node of the tweets was collected 
in the information.  While the Twitter Search API used by NodeXL had the capabilities to 
pick up past tweets to complement the tweet gathered from the Streaming data, there is 
no guarantee that all of the first tweets were gathered, or even that all tweets in general 
were gathered.  Likewise, if three-fourths of ISIS’s followers and supporters were using 
one keyword or hashtag, and the researcher chose to use the keyword or hashtag that the 
other one-fourth of the followers and supporters were using, then not all tweets relevant 
to the critical incidents were gathered. 
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 Another limitation to the collection of data is the nature of the tweets and users 
themselves.  ISIS is not a capitalist corporation or a non-profit, it is an organization 
classified as a terrorist group by the United Nations (UN.org, 2015), the European Union 
(Wahlisch, 2010), and many other world powers.  Their presence and the information 
they disseminate are often restricted.  Many of ISIS’s followers and supporters have their 
accounts suspended and their information deleted.  This became even more relevant after 
ISIS released the first video of Japanese hostage Kenji Goto (Shiloach, 2015).  Between 
that time and the later release of Goto’s execution video, Twitter suspended more than 
1,400 ISIS accounts, many shortly after the release of the execution video.  These 
suspensions have not stopped.  The last week of February 2015 saw more than 2,000 ISIS 
accounts suspended (Ross, Meek, & Ferran, 2015).  Many of these suspended and deleted 
accounts were rich data sources for the hashtags and keywords necessary for data 
collection.  There is no way to get them back.  Due to suspended and deleted accounts, 
there will not be 100% relevant and complete data collected. 
 Two other limitations of this research are focused on bias and reliability.  The bias 
comes from the researcher.  As a Western-born and educated non-Muslim, the researcher 
is an outsider to most of these communities.  And, while this outside perspective can help 
in being a neutral, non-biased researcher, it also means that there are aspects of the 
culture and ideology that the researcher will not understand and may be unable to truly 
comprehend.  This is mostly seen with the limitation on language.  Lack of Arabic 
language skills means that the researcher is assuming that if the Tweet includes the 
English keywords, then it is relevant.  This relevancy also plays into the reliability 
because there was no way for the researcher to verify if the Twitter user was who they 
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said they were or even if they believe what they said they believe in.  The researcher does 
not have the contacts nor the resources to look into verifying such information.  If the 
user had tweets supporting ISIS, images supporting ISIS, and claimed to be an ISIS 
supporter, then the researcher assumed they were an ISIS supporter.  All of the above 




 The following narrative will take the reader through how the researcher decided 
whether to use the Search API, Streaming API, or both and what hashtags to use when 
deciding how to gather data.  This narrative will focus on Critical Incident 3, the release 
of Dabiq magazine.  On February 12th, the research became aware that ISIS had realized 
another propaganda magazine.  Knowing this would be a big event for ISIS supporters, 
the research started looking at ISIS supporters on Twitter, many, if not all, of whom are 
now suspended and whose accounts have been deleted.  By looking through these 
accounts, the researcher realized that unlike the execution videos – which almost always 
used the title of the video to trend a hashtag – there was no seemingly discernable 
English-language hashtag to use.  Because of this lack of discernable hashtag, the 
researcher decided against using the Streaming API because it would result in too many 
false positive results for the researcher to manually analyze.  Instead, the researcher 
decided to use NodeXL’s import from Twitter function because it would gather and 
format data into an easier-to-use format than the Streaming API.  In order to see what 
hashtag should be used, the researcher started inserting search keywords into the import 
from Twitter search function to see what kind of information appeared.  After reviewing 
the ISIS supporters on Twitter, the researcher decided to simply “Dabiq” to gather data 
and to see if there would be any way to filter the data in order to gain the most relevant 
data set for analysis.  The brief results that came up from this search term also included 
the url from which the magazine was linked.  The researcher noticed that archive.org was
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a frequent url in the results list.  Knowing from previous research and use of Twitter, the 
researcher knew that archive.org was often used by ISIS supporters to tweet links to 
images or videos that they wanted to ensure would not be broken by being removed by 
the overarching host.  The researcher chose a handful of tweets that contained an 
archive.org url to review, and the tweets either contained pro-ISIS sentiment or the users 
themselves had a Twitter that name that showed support for ISIS.  Based on this, the 
researcher decided to filter this small result set and then review the data.  Once filtered, 
the data showed a lot of ISIS supporters that were interconnected.  This graph of the 
small data set convinced the researcher to use the keyword “Dabiq” and then to filter the 
final results in order to gain the most relevant data.  Twenty-four hours after the initial 
release of the magazine, the researcher went back and entered the keyword “Dabiq” into 
the import from Twitter search feature.  The results of this search were then filtered for 
the archive.org url, reviewed to ensure that the collected data still contained relevant 
results, and then finally, this data set was used for final review for Critical Incident 3.
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